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Showing posts from May, 2016

Building a “transition coalition”

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There are certain similarities between the elements of successful organizational change management and R2O transition activities. The strongest parallels are between the reform coalition of change management and the “transition coalition” of R2O, as I will refer to it here. The “transition coalition” consists predominantly of the users that are responsible for applying a new innovation to operational duties, improving a workflow. There is one distinct difference between a reform coalition that is discussed in organizational change circles and the “transition coalition” concept. Whereas a reform coalition typically fits into an organizational hierarchy, senior management usually does not guide the “transition coalition” for each specific innovation. Senior leaders instead should build and support the framework. If senior management proffers an opinion on an innovation, it may modulate organic feedback and ultimately thwart the need for a “transition coalition” within the construct of R

Provisioning R2O to counteract groupthink in operations

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Author Note: This post is particularly applicable to meteorology, but others implementing R2O in an environment that requires tactical decisions may find this discussion relatable. Imprecise, if not outright incorrect, predictions of severe weather have been the bane of the meteorological enterprise since the emergence of the atmosphere as a chaotic but physical fluid. As science continues to sharpen the skill of weather forecasts, recent attention has focused on better communication principles and provisions of decision support. But who is communicating, who is listening, what information is sought, and how much uncertainty is allowable? The challenge with predictions that miss the mark is that the degree of the miss is almost never clear beyond debate. When a tornado outbreak is forecast, but numerous destructive but non-tornadic thunderstorms form instead, is the forecast a “bust”? In hindsight, were there indicators that may have suggested a different threat, or was there simply no